Following a science and ontology conference in Barbizon, France, Layla Raïd and Karim Belabas published an article on Peirce and Quine that focuses on truth considered as the convergence of opinions or theories. 2 The article is a productive collaboration between a philosopher and mathematician, identifying two problems that Quine poses: first, the use of numerical analogy in Peirce’s account of truth, and second, the uniqueness of the final opinion, which can presumably be defeated or undermined by arguments (...) from underdetermination of theories. 3 I accept their interpretation insofar as these two problems are considered to constitute main issues for those—including myself—who wish to advocate Peirce’s view, but.. (shrink)

Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that (...) we have abundant reason to reject. Once we reject it, we can see how issues of the absorbtion of conventions, the revisability of belief, and confirmation holism are compatible with the Traditional Distinctions, and that Quine's discussion only serves to camouflage the question of whether some confirmation relations are constitutive of meaning and knowable a priori. (shrink)

A response to Graham Stevens’s response to Lugg, ‘Russell as a Precursor of Quine’ (Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly, nos. 128-129, pp. 9-21). Stevens challenges the argument of this paper that from 1912, if not earlier, Russell was “a naturalistically-minded epistemologist in the Quinean mould”. He maintains that to the contrary “Russell cannot be accurately characterized as an empiricist” and “Russell’s greatest influence on Quine’s naturalistic project did not stem from his epistemology but from his semantics”. In the present (...) note it is argued Stevens overlooks that Russell is in the empiricist camp as well as the naturalist camp and the empiricist elements of Russell’s philosophy are secondary to his naturalism. (shrink)

While discussing the work of Kuhn and Hanson, John Greenwood (1990) misidentifies the nature of the relationship between the incommensurability of theories and the theory-ladenness of observation. After pointing out this error, I move on to consider Greenwood's main argument that the Quine-Duhem thesis suffers from a form of epistemological self-defeat if it is interpreted to mean that any recalcitrant observation can always be accommodated to any theory. Greenwood finds this interpretation implausible because some adjustments to auxiliary hypotheses undermine (...) too much of the prior observational evidence for the test theory. I argue that Greenwood mistakes the logico-metaphysical Quine-Duhem thesis for an epistemological one. All the argument he takes to undercut it actually illustrates how well the thesis works on a practical level. This is illustrated with an example from contemporary immunology. (shrink)

This is a reply by J.J. Katz to criticism of his views on Quine's indeterminacy thesis.

Chapter I announces the aim of the book, which is, to deal with the question: What is a language? It also registers complaints against current semantical methods. The sections here are closely related to Quine's Two Dogmas, but the author finds himself dissatisfied, not just with analyticity, but also with logical truth, truth, designation. The difficulties are of two orders. In one case they would be dissolved by having general definitions of the terms in question. In the other case (...) we should have to discuss use of a language and that would take us into pragmatics. It turns out that to get our "general" definitions we have to define "language," "logical truth," and "G-designation" all at once, so to speak. Chapter II lays down criteria of adequacy for a definition of "language": two languages are identical if and only if they have the same vocabulary and every expression has the same significance in one language as it has in the other. Now the author has to cope with "significance." In Chapter III, he follows Quine in holding that an extensional languages recognizes at most individuals, truth-values, and classes; and an intensional or modal language recognizes at most individual concepts, properties, and propositions. The author wants to have it both ways: like lots of people, he wants individuals and properties and propositions. To have it both ways, he has to work out a new semantical method ; and since his properties and propositions are not the familiar intensions, he has to call them G-properties and G-propositions. If these entities are named in the language then they are G-designated by their names. (shrink)

In my reply to michael devitt, It is argued, First, That quine fails to appreciate the force of plato's "one over many" argument for universals. It is argued, Second, That quine's failure springs in part at least from his doctrine of ontological commitment: from the view that predicates need not be treated with ontological seriousness. Finally, An attempt is made to blunt the force of devitt's contention that realists cannot give a coherent explanation of the way that (...) universals stand to particulars. (shrink)

After some preliminary remarks in §1, I argue in §2 that Claudio’s considerations about my treatment of Quine’s Bizet-Verdi counterfactuals do not constitute a difficulty for the structural analysis of such counterfactuals. I discuss some of his other examples and argue that counterfactuals are ambiguous both structurally and contextually. I conclude with an examination of the principle of transitivity for counterfactuals.

In ‘Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline,’ Williams is mistaken in thinking that I accused him of thinking that that we can describe the world ‘as it is anyway’ without using concepts. Our real disagreement is over whether it makes sense to think that the concepts of physics do this. The central issue is this: the notion of ‘absoluteness’ is defined using at least one semantical notion (‘convergence’). If Williams' view is to work, I argue, at least one semantical notion needs (...) to be absolute. But Williams himself concedes that semantical notions cannot be reduced to physical ones, and the ‘absolute conception’ is supposed to be given in terms of primary qualities alone. (shrink)

This essay responds to Jeff Malpas's foregoing article, itself written in response to my various publications over the past two decades concerning Donald Davidson's ideas about truth, meaning, and interpretation. It has to do mainly with our disagreement as regards the substantive content of Davidson's truth-based semantic approach in relation to the problematic legacy of logical empiricism, including Quine's incisive but no less problematical critique of that legacy. I also raise questions with respect to Malpas's coupling of Davidson with (...) Heidegger, intended to provide a more adequate depth-ontological grounding for the formalized (logico-semantic) conception of truth that Davidson adopts from Tarski. My essay then argues the case for an outlook of objectivist causal realism joined with a theory of inference to the best, most rational explanation that would satisfy this need in more philosophically (as well as scientifically) accountable terms. (shrink)

Author's replies to an APA book symposium on "Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard.".

Totality states of affairs (Russell's 'general facts') are defended against Martin's criticisms. Although higher-order, they are not 'abstract in Quine's sense. If space-time is the whole of being, and if it can be seen as a vast conjunction of states of affairs, then the state of affairs that this is the totality of lower-order states of affairs is not additional to, but completes, space-times. If totality states of affairs are admitted, then there seems no need for any further negative (...) states of affairs additional to totality states of affairs. (shrink)

In these replies, I respond to critics in the book symposium on my Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, Lexington Books, 2022.